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The Federal Reserve in Crisis 
John A. Tatom 
 
Since August 2007 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) has 
approached near panic in their adoption of multiple and inconsistent traditional policy 
measures and, since December 2007, they have multiplied these efforts by adopting 
major new policy tools, some of which may go well beyond their congressional mandate.  
These actions have been motivated, in the first instance, by an emerging mortgage 
foreclosure crisis that began in late-2006 and that the Fed first recognized in May 2007, 
in the second instance by a credit crisis that emerged in August in Europe and quickly 
moved on shore.  This article summarizes and explains the Fed actions since last August.   
 
Normal policy actions 
The Fed conducts monetary policy primarily through setting a federal funds rate target 
and a primary credit rate (formerly called the discount rate).  The federal funds rate is the 
rate at which depository institutions (banks) borrow or lend funds held in their deposit 
accounts at the Fed. This rate is agreed between borrower and lender institutions on 
individual loan transactions, generally overnight.  The Fed attempts to intervene in 
Treasury security market through open market operations, which are the purchase or sale 
of Treasury securities with primary security dealers, in order to change the amount of 
depository institutions’ deposits at the Fed.  The Fed does this in order to influence the 
federal funds rate and to keep the monthly average of daily average rates at its target rate. 
The primary credit rate is the rate at which qualifying depository institutions can borrow 
from the Fed directly, again generally overnight. Borrowing from the Fed is not common 
or frequent for banks.       
 
Table 1 shows the multiple, frequent and sometimes large changes in the federal funds 
target rate and discount rate since August 2007.  There are two large changes in the 
federal funds rate that equaled 75 basis points, one in January at an unscheduled meeting, 
followed up eight days later with another 50 basis point cut.  Either the situation was 
deteriorating faster than at any time in history, or the changes reflected some degree of 
hesitancy or indecision on the part of the Fed. Note that the lead-off action was a cut in 
the discount rate in August 2007.  This reflects the character of the problem.  Apparently, 
the Fed’s primary concern was to direct credit to financial institutions most in need of 
liquidity assistance instead of sending a generalized signal of easier credit as indicated by 
a federal funds rate cut. The narrowing of the spread between the federal funds rate and 
primary credit rate also reflects a decision to make credit easier for borrowing banks 
since the spread had been fixed by policy since 2004.   
  
Another set of actions that constitute normal policy responses to international financial 
market disruptions are swaps loans of U.S. dollars for foreign currencies. Pressures in 
credit markets abroad led the Fed, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National 
Bank to agree to bilateral swap arrangements of $20 billion and $4 billion, respectively, 
on December 7, 2007, and to extend and increase them to $30 billion and $6 billion on 
March 11, 2008. These actions were generally perceived to have reduced the liquidity 
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shortfall of dollars in Europe and London and to bring down the London Interbank 
Borrowing Rate (LIBOR), which had spiked up relative to the fed funds rate.      
 
Table 1: “Normal” Policy Actions since January 2007 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) 
Federal 
funds 
rate (%) 
Change 
(basis 
points) 
Primary 
credit 
rate (%) 
Change 
(basis 
points) 
Effective 
date 
Spread 
(primary 
credit – 
fed funds) 
Scheduled 
meeting 
5.25% 25 6.25 25 6/29/06 100 Yes 
NA NA 5.75 -50 8/17/07 50 No 
4.75 -50 5.25 -50 9/8/07 50 Yes 
4.50 -25 5.00 -25 10/31/07 50 Yes 
4.25 -25 4.75 -25 12/11/07 50 Yes 
3.50 -75 4.00 -75 1/22/08 50 No 
3.00 -25 3.50 -50 1/30/08 50 Yes 
2.25 -75 2.50 -100 3/18/08 25 Yes 
 
New policy actions 
Throughout the credit crunch, the Fed has exhibited a profound concern for directing 
credit to the financial sector where the evidence of the credit crunch was believed to be 
greatest.  In August and September 2007 and again in December 2007, there were large 
surges in borrowing from the Fed through discount lending to banks. Financial market 
conditions apparently deteriorated again in March 2008.  As a result, the Fed created new 
a credit program in December 2007 and took several new steps in March 2008. The chart 
below from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis shows the unusual surges in 
borrowing.  After March 12, 2008, the data go far beyond the grid.     
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Financial Data, March 21, 2007 
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The first new credit facility implemented by the Fed is the Term Auction Facility (TAF), 
announced on December 12, 2007.  This facility allows banks to acquire funds in regular 
auctions for 28 days with the same collateral as would be required for borrowing at the 
discount window.  The amount of funds auctioned is announced ahead of time and the 
market determines the auction rate at which transactions occur.  Initially auction amounts 
were $20 billion but have been raised to $50 billion.  The purpose of the TAF is to 
overcome the aversion of banks to borrow from the Fed through the discount window.  
The rates at which banks have borrowed are near the target federal funds rate, allowing 
for expectations of declines over the next 28 days, an alternative borrowing rate for banks 
borrowing from another bank.     
 
The second new facility, announced on March 7 and expanded on March 11, 2008, is the 
Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF), which began on March 27, 2008.  This program 
arose in light of the liquidity and solvency problems at Bear Stearns, which teetered on 
insolvency on Friday, March 14, 2008, and the potential for contagion or illiquidity at 
other investment banks. Most large investment banks are also authorized as primary 
security dealers by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and are authorized to buy and 
sell U.S. securities with the Fed. Currently there are 20 primary dealers, but two (Bear 
Stearns and Countrywide Securities) will disappear soon due to mergers.  Bear Stearns 
agreed to merge with JPMorgan Chase, subject to their board’s approval, on March 16, 
2008, with the Fed’s approval. 
 
The TSLF will provide up to $200 billion in U.S. Treasury securities through a weekly 
auction of Treasury securities loans to primary dealers for a term of 28 days. The 
collateral asset is essentially a sort of swap, though not technically called one, with the 
Fed. It can include government agency debt, including residential mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), or AAA/Aaa private label MBS (which some have referred to as the 
toxic waste of the financial system because they are relatively illiquid due to uncertainties 
of what each security contains), and commercial MBS.  The increased availability of 
Treasury securities at financial institutions is expected to improve liquidity in the repo 
market in particular, and to enhance liquidity at financial institutions.  There is already an 
overnight security lending facility (since December 2006), but this new facility adds 
more certainty to availability of the securities and terms.  
 
A third program that grew out of the sale of Bear Stearns is the extension of credit to 
cover the potential loss on the least liquid and highest loss potential securities on the 
books of Bear Stearns. Initially these loans were to Bear Stearns and averaged about $5.5 
billion for the week ending March 19, 2008, or $7.74 billion for the five days from March 
16 through March 18, 2008.  By March 19, 2008 these loans had been repaid.  The 
commitment by the Fed to lend to Bear Stearns was later formalized in the creation of a 
special investment vehicle (SIV), though the Fed does not refer to it as such.  This is the 
arrangement that banks had used that led to the outbreak of the credit crunch and collapse 
of the asset backed commercial paper market that had financed bank SIVs in August, 
2007. See Williams (2008) for more details. Under the Fed’s new SIV, the Fed will lend 
$29 billion and JPMorgan Chase will lend $1 billion, with the SIV using the proceeds to 
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acquire $30 billion of the most illiquid and dubious securities from Bear Stearns 
portfolio.  These securities are valued on a “mark-to-market” basis as of March 14, 2008.  
The SIV will be managed by Black Rock Financial Management, Inc. The interest rate on 
the Fed’s loan will be the primary credit rate and the interest rate on JPMorgan Chase’s 
loan will be the primary credit rate plus 475 basis points.  Repayment is to begin no later 
than the second anniversary date of the loan. The Fed is the effective owner of the SIV 
because any profit or loss will accrue to the Fed after the first $1 billion loss, which will 
accrue to JPMorgan Chase.  The term of the loans is 10 years, but this term is renewable 
at the discretion of the Fed.  
 
Most analysts refer to this arrangement as a “bailout” of Bear Stearns.  This is a strange 
notion since Bear Stearns will cease to exist and the biggest losers will be the owners of 
Bear Stearns, 30 percent of whom are employees.  It is understandable, however because 
of the lack of information on the structure of the loans and closure of Bear Stearns and 
also because at the outset, the Fed loaned funds to Bear Stearns for a few days. The initial 
loan from March 14, 2008 was quickly repaid and the existing commitment is to create a 
Fed-owned SIV which will hold assets that have a mark-to-market value in excess of the 
Fed loan. Bear Stearns will cease to exist under the arrangement, taken over by JPMorgan 
Chase at a fire sale price of $10 per share. This means that the owners of Bear Stearns 
(again, 30 percent of whom are employees) will lose nearly all of their equity in the firm, 
and many employees will lose their jobs in the transition of ownership to JPMorgan 
Chase. If there was a bailout, it was for JPMorgan Chase and they are likely to profit 
handsomely on the transaction. The biggest losers are the owners of Bear Stearns.  One 
implication of the Fed loan, however, is that it creates the expectation that investment 
banks can be “too big to fail,” at least for the four that were larger than Bear Stearns. 
Another is that the willingness to lend to investment banks now has created questions in 
political and other circles as to whether investment banks should also be regulated by the 
Fed. Of course the logic here is tortured because Bear Stearns will go out of business as a 
condition of the loan, and regulating them would not have protected them from failing.  
Moreover, the arrangement with JPMorgan Chase is more like a forced merger such as 
can occur when a bank fails; that is more similar to the bank insurer’s function than the 
Fed’s concern.    
 
The fourth new facility created by the Fed is the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 
announced on March 16 with initial transactions on March 17, 2008.  This facility allows 
for Fed lending to primary dealers for up to 6 months at the primary credit rate with the 
normal collateral required for discount lending to banks.      
 
The Fed has largely neutralized their efforts until recently 
New and traditional credit facilities have been relatively large but have not carried 
through fully to the bottom line, the Fed’s total assets.  The reason is that new loans have 
been “sterilized” by sales of other assets on the books of the Fed, especially their holding 
of U.S. government securities. This is somewhat like the way a traditional commercial 
bank would meet an emergency credit demand by a client: it might reduce credit 
availability to other customers because of its existing funding. But even today, a 
commercial bank would recognize that it could meet this new credit demand without 
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disrupting its business by seeking new funding in the form of deposits in the marketplace. 
The key textbook distinction between a commercial bank and a central bank is that the 
latter is unconstrained by its liabilities or its funding.  A central bank can print money, so 
if there is a new credit demand that it wishes to meet, it can print money instead of selling 
or reducing other assets.  This was the great error of the Fed in the Great Depression; it 
did not expand its assets to produce more money and credit in the economy to stimulate 
spending. It made this mistake because it acted like a private commercial bank and not a 
central bank. Ironically, the Fed is doing this again, behaving even more like a 
commercial bank by aggressively expanding its credit to the private sector.    
 
Table 2 shows key elements of the assets of the Fed at the beginning of the crisis and in 
the week of March 26, 2008.  The data come from the Fed’s weekly H.4.1 release for 
August 2, 2007, the week before the credit crisis component of the mortgage foreclosure 
crisis, and March 27, 2008, the latest week available. Note first that Securities bought 
outright have declined dramatically since August 2007. Securities normally account for 
over 90 percent of Fed assets, but have declined 20.4 percent in the past eight months, an 
amount equal to 18 percent of current total assets of the Fed. This is a dramatic and 
unprecedented shrinkage, all the more so at a time when the Fed is expected and claiming 
to be increasing liquidity and credit in the financial system.  Overall total assets rose only 
$21.7 billion over the period, or about 2.5 percent.  Such offsetting of asset acquisitions 
by sales of other assets is usually restricted to foreign exchange transactions and is 
referred to as sterilization; in effect, the Fed is sterilizing its credit extensions to financial 
institutions by liquidating its holding of Treasury securities.    
 
The Fed has switched their credit from the U.S. government to banks and primary 
dealers, a slight majority of which are affiliated with banks or bank holding companies.  
Expansion of traditional lending to depository institutions has been trivial, except during 
a few periods noted above, but new facilities such as the TAF and PDCF have swelled to 
more than 12 percent of Fed total assets, increasing $113.5 billion since August 1, 2007.  
 
Another category shown in Table 2 is Repurchase agreements (RPs).  These are short-
term acquisitions of Treasury securities from primary dealers under agreements to be sold 
back to the primary dealers at a fixed price. Normally these are overnight transactions, 
but there sometimes are term RPs that can run a few days or even a few weeks. RPs 
surged, increasing by $59.0 billion over the past eight months.  An RP is normally a way 
the Fed provides funds to support bank reserves temporarily.  They indirectly, at least, 
have an effect of easing the cost pressures on primary dealers by holding down their 
inventory cost of holding securities, in order to support their business with financial 
institutions as dealers in Treasury securities. In the current context, they represent another 
way the Fed is trying to channel credit to depository institutions and investment banks 
and away from the U.S. government and also to accommodate investment banks’ demand 
for high quality securities by, in effect, borrowing those securities overnight rather than 
buying outright from them. In effect, the investment banks gain flexibility in their own 
Treasury security holdings, which is critical to their liquidity and funding requirements.  
RPs have more than tripled, rising to almost 10 percent of the Fed’s assets.  If linked with 
other credit lines shown below in Table 2, credit to financial institutions has risen from 
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about 3 percent of the Fed’s balance sheet at the beginning of the crisis to more than 22 
percent of the balance sheet.   
 
Table 2 
The Fed has offset most of the new credit by selling securities 
Federal Reserve Balance Sheet (millions of dollars)  
Selected Assets 
(average for week 
ending on date 
indicated) 
 
 
 
March 26, 2008 
 
 
 
August 1, 2007 
 
 
 
Change 
Securities bought 
outright 
 
$628,977 
 
$790,758 
 
-$161,781 
Repurchase 
agreements 
 
   84,821 
 
    25,786 
 
     59,035 
Term auction credit 
(TAF) 
 
  80,000 
 
NA 
 
    80,000 
Primary credit   550  2    548 
Primary dealer 
Credit facility 
(PDCF) 
 
 
  32,923 
 
 
NA 
 
 
    32923 
Other credit 
extensions 
 
0 
 
NA 
 
  0 
Total credit 113,473   2   113,471 
Total assets 
(end of period) 
 
895,768 
 
874,112 
 
21,656 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
The other new programs discussed above do not currently affect the Fed’s balance sheet.  
The $29 billion loan to fund the acquisition of former Bear Stearns securities will show 
up in the “other credit extensions” shown in the table, at least if the same practice as was 
used in the loans during the period March 14-18, 2008 is followed.  This loan is not likely 
to show up until the transaction occurs, most likely on the day that the expected merger 
of Bear Stearns is completed in a couple of months. The other new facility, the TSLF, 
began on March 27, 2008 when $75 billion was auctioned in the first weekly auction.  
Since there is an exchange of collateral securities under this program, there is no effect on 
overall Fed assets, only their composition.          
 
Prospects 
There are numerous issues posed by the Fed’s policy actions since last August, especially 
the necessity and appropriateness of the new credit facilities and whether they, in turn, 
require that Congress provide new regulatory powers to the Fed.  The other concern 
going forward is how much longer and how severe the financial crisis will become.  Alan 
Greenspan recently answered this question in the Financial Times: 
 
The current financial crisis in the US is likely to be judged as the most wrenching 
since the end of the Second World War.  It will end eventually when home prices 
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stabilise and with them the value of equity in homes supporting troubled mortgage 
securities.  
 
Of course, this is not a date certain.  It is likely also to be most dependent upon, if not 
more fully determined by, when the mortgage foreclosure crisis begins to end. Most 
forecasts of that date are late in 2008 or in 2009 because mortgage resets, contractual 
increases in payments whether interest rate remain the same or even fall somewhat, on 
most adjustable rate subprime loans are not expected to ease until then. A second critical 
factor for the end of the financial crisis is the continuation of rapid monetary aggregate 
growth with some pass-through to accelerated credit growth.  This is perhaps the most 
important factor in reversing the slowing in spending growth and in credit growth. Given 
the lag in monetary policy, the fact that it takes some time, perhaps six to nine months, 
before actions to accelerate the growth of money and credit begin to bear results in terms 
of higher spending and output, and the fact that monetary aggregates did not accelerate 
until January 2008, it is going to be awhile before the financial crisis can be laid to rest.  
Political uncertainties and uncertainties about the prospects for federal tax and spending 
increases underlying the current economic outlook are also not likely to be resolved soon.       
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